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ADMISSIBILITY OF PREVIOUS CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS BY A WITNESS
Today the courts are almost unanimous in holding that proof of
statements made by a witness out of court similar to and in
harmony with his testimony are inadmissible.
"This rule of evidence," said Mr. Justice Holloway, speaking
for the Supreme Court of Montana in the case of Fasrlengh v.
Kelley (1903),' "became settled long ago." It is unquestionably
supported by the decided weight of authority, and in fact, it may
now be said that the rule is more than general-it is well nigh
universal. 2 There are, however, well settled exceptions to this general rule.8 In fact, the exceptions "have become so well established
as now to constitute themselves an independent rule." 4 They are,
however, very few in number 5 and rest upon exceptional circum6
stances.
In each case the question is whether the circumstances are such
as to make the evidence admissible. 7
A. Imputations against Veracity
1. Charges of recent fabrication of testimony
The principal exception to the general rule of evidence that the
statements of a witness out of court are inadmissible, is the one
mentioned by Mr. Justice Story, that "Where the testimony of the
witness is assailed as a fabrication of recent date, or a complaint
recently made, in order to repel such imputation, proof of the
antecedent declarations of the witness consistent with his testimony
may be received."s
In the early Pennsylvania case of Craig v. Craeg (1835), 9 the
138 Mont. 421, 72 Pac. 756, 63 L. R. A. 319 (1903).

2Note, 41 L. R. A. (n. s.)879 and cases there cited.
'In re Hesdra, 119 N. Y. 615, 23 N. E. 555 (1890).
'Legere v. State, 111 Tenn. 368, 77 S. W 1059, 102 A. S. R. 781 (1903).
5 Deehert v. Municipal Elect. Lt. So., 390 App. Div. 490, 57 N. Y. Supp.
225 (1899).
°Ewing v. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 52 Pac. 4 (1898).
U. S. v. Neverson, 1 Mackay (D. C.) 152 (1880).
Ellicot v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 9 L. Ed. 475 (1836).

95 Rowle (Pa.) 91 (1835).
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court reviewed all the authorities on this question and concluded.
"That consonant declarations may be given in contradiction of evidence tending to show that the testimony at
bar is a fabrication of recent date, and to show that the
same statement was made before the ultimate effect on the
question trying could have been foreseen."
The court, in discussing the facts of the particular case, continued.
"We come to an inquiry into the time and circumstances
of the declarations made by General Craig to entitle him
to the benefit of the pension laws. These were made in
1822 and 1823-the last on the 12th day of May in that
year. The earliest information we have of a contest between the parties is given by William Craig, who testifies
to an inquiry by the defendant, in the October following,
into the real state of the transaction in consequence of an
intimation that the plaintiff was about to sue him. At tins
time for aught but appears, General Craig was in harmony
with the parties, and his previous statements while his
passions and prejudice were in a state of repose, and
especially when he could not have foreseen the existence
of the present controversy, or the bearing which Ins declarations nnght have on it, are indisputably within the
exception to the general rule. These declarations were
properly admitted."
The above case is a good illustration of the application of the
exception to the general rule. The reasonableness of tins exception
is apparent. Because where counsel on the other side has attacked
the testimony of the witness of a fabrication of recent date, the witness should be allowed to repel such inputation, which is successfully done where it can be shown he has made a similar statement
prior to trial and at a time when its ultimate effect and operation
arising from a change of circumstances could not be foreseen. Consequently "this use of former similar statements is universally conceded to be proper." 10
This exception to the general rule is usually stated that "it may
be shown in answer to evidence tending to make it appear that
the testimony of a witness was a fabrication of recent date, that
he gave the same account of the transactions to winch he testified
at a time when the ultimate effect and operation of his statements
"2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1129, p. 648.
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could not have been foreseen."" To bring the case within the exception, it is necessary, therefore, that the witness' testimony be impeached upon the grounds that it has been recently fabricated and
secondly that the prior consistent statements offered to show that
it is not a recent fabrication have been made at a time when its
ultimate effect and operation could not have been foreseen.
It is essential that the narrow limits of this exception be born in
mind, for as was stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 2 a
prior consistent statement should never be admitted "where it is
clear that the statement so relied upon was made at a time when
it was to the interest of the witness to make a false statement,"
for, it is self-evident that a statement made under such circumstances would not have any corroborative support and therefore
should be excluded. Furthermore, the testimony in every case
should have been actually attacked as a recent fabrication before
the exception is invoked, for, while in a certain sense it is always
true that a prior statement of the witness inconsistent with his
testimony on the trial, tends or may tend to show the testimony
to have been recently fabricated, still, if the exception to the
rule is to be broad enough to permit in every such case the introduction of prior consistent statements to prop up the credibility
of the witness, the exception would very soon abolish the general
rule.",
2. Motive to falsify
Another exception to the rule is recognized where the witness
is testifying under the influence of some strong motive prompting him to make a false or colored statement, in which case his
prior consistent statements are admissible to prove that he is
not influenced by the motive imputed to him.
The application of this rule is well illustrated by the case of
Nashvffle, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lawson (1900) '4 In that case a
witness testifying in .a civil action against a railroad company,
was cross-examined with a view to establish that she had journeyed from another state in order to testify, upon a promise of
a reward, in such wise as to attack her credibility and discredit
her testimony The court held that it was competent to prove by
another witness that immediately following the infliction of
1"41 L. R. A. (n.s.) 890 and cases there cited.
See note 4, supra.

"Com. v. Tucker 189 Mass. 457, 76 N. E. 127, 7 L. M. A. (n.s.) 1056

(1905).

105 Tenn. 639, 58 S. W 480 (1900).

',
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such injuries, and before she could have known that she would
be called upon as a witness, she had given a similar account of
the accident. That a prior consistent statement has corroborative
support under such circumstances seems unquestionable.
This exception is very well stated by Dean Wigmore, who in
his work on Evidence, says :15
"A consistent statement at a time prior to the existence
of a fact said to indicate Bias, Interest, or Corruption, will
effectively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence, because it is thus made to appear that the statement
in the form now uttered was independent of the discreditmg influence. The former statements are therefore admissible."
It is thus seen that this rule may be invoked under various
sets of circumstances, as in the following examples.
a. Where a charge is made that the witness was induced to
testify as he did on the trial by the hope or promise of money 16
b. Where it is charged that the testimony is the result of some
relation to the party or to the cause, or of some motive of personal
7

interest..

c. Where the witness was impeached by the testimony of a person
who heard him say that detectives had been trying to get him
to swear to a certain statement, but that he had refused because
the statement was a lie; and when it has been further proved that
such witness was resentful because the opposing party had refused
to sell him a suit of clothes on credit.'8
Under the rule it is sometimes a matter of nice 3udgment to
determine that no motive at a given time existed to misrepresent the
facts, but whenever it is clear that a prior consistent statement was
made at a time when the witness was neither biased, corrupted or
interested, either in the litigant or the cause, and the witness has
been impeached in one of these ways, his prior consistent statement
is valuable in removing the discredit so placed upon his testimony
3. Complaint in sex crimes.
In criminal trials for rape and assault with intent to ravish, the
2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1128, p. 647.

'

Lyles v. Lyles, 1 Hill Eq. 76 (1833).
"'Drtggs v. 17. S., 21 Okla. 60, 95 Pac. 612, 12a A. S. R, 823, 17 Ann. Cas.

66 (1908).

.Keley-Goodfellow S.hoe

S. W 1027 (1894).

Co. v. Lib. In. Co., 8 Tex. Civ. App. 227, 28
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courts are unanimous in holding that the fact that immediately
following the commission of the offense the victim made a complaint of the outrage upon her, is admissible in evidence to corroborate her testimony of the crime, even though she has not been
impeached. 19
This exception to the general rule came down to us in our early
law as a traditional relic of the old law of hue and cry 20 The following passage from Bracton, writing in the 1200's, is of interest
in showing the ancient rule from which this exception was developed.2
"When, therefore, a virgin has been so deflowered and
overpowered, against the peace of the lord the king, forthwith and while the act is fresh, she ought to repair with
hue and cry to the neighboring hills and there display to
honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her
dress stained with blood, and the tearing of her dress,
and so she ought to go to the provost of the hundred and
to the serjeant of the lord the king and to the viscount
and make her appeal at the first county court."
In about the 1700's, as more attention began to be given the principles underlying the admissibility of evidence, the courts began
to search for reasons to explain this inherited and hitherto unquestioned practice. As a result, the majority of the modern cases have
taken the view that the fact a complaint was made is admissible in
corroboration of the prosecutrix, for the reason that a failure to
speak when it is natural to do so, is in effect an inconsistent statement or self-contradiction, and the fact that a complaint has been
made negatives the supposed inconsistency of silence by showing
that there was not silence.
The statement of Mr. Justice Bartch in the case of State v. Neal
(1900),22 IS illustrative of the attitude of the courts adopting this
analysis of the situation
"The natural instinct of a female thus outraged and injured prompts her to disclose the occurrence at the earliest
opportunity, to the relative or friend who naturally has the
deepest interest in her welfare, and the absence of such dis1 41 L. R. A. (n.s.) 886 and cases there cited.
"Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Cor. v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 51
N. E. 746 (1898), gives a very complete statement of the origin of this
exception.
H. D. Bracton, f. 147.
221
Utah 151, 60 Pac. 510 (1900).
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closure tends to discredit her as a witness and may raise
an inference against the truth of the charge. To avoid
such discredit, it is competent for the prosecution to anticipate any claim as to effects, and show by affirmative proof
of the victim and of her relative or friends to whom she narrated the circumstances of the outrage, the complaint was
made recently after its commission."
The only purpose under this theory in introducing the fact of
complaint is to remove the inference of discredit, which would be
imputed to her if she had remained silent. This object is accomplished by merely showing that m fact she did complain. The
details of the complaint are consequently immaterial for the purpose
and are therefore inadmissible. 23 Many courts have held the details
of the complaint should be excluded because of the danger of allowing a designing female to corroborate her testimony by statements
made by herself to third parties, and the difficulty, of disproving
the principal fact by the accused. 24
This exception to the general rule holding the fact of complaint
admissible, like.the other exceptions, is based upon the reason that
such evidence has valuable corroborative force. With this in mind,
some courts have excluded even the fact of complaint where it was
not seasonably made, on the ground that when made after a long
delay it has lost its relevancy as corroborative evidence. 25 Other
courts, however, have held that mere lapse of time affects only its
26
weight, which is a circumstance for the consideration of .the jury
Under the early law of hue and cry, the details of the complaint
were undoubtedly admissible.2 7 It would seem at first blush that
some courts have adopted this traditional rule in its entirety and
are m direct conflict with the cases holding admissible only the fact
that a complaint was made.
These decisions, however, when closely analysed, will show in
the great majority of cases, to be based on the rule that where a
witness has been impeached, prior consistent statements are admissible as corroborative evidence. It would seem, therefore, that
the conflict is apparent, rather than real, because if the prosecutrix' testimony has been impeached in such a way as to allow
prior consistent statements, which will depend upon the view
taken of the general principle n each particular jurisdiction, it
12 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1136, p. 658.
2,22 R. C. L. 1214.
z State v. Griffi7 43 Wash. 591, 86 Pac. 951 (1906).
2 2 Wigmore on Evidence
(2nd Ed.), Sec. 1135, p. 657.
3 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1760, p. 764.
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cannot be denied that it is a legitimate application of the principle
to admit the details of her complaint- the prior consistent statements.28
WASHINGTON CASES

A. Charges of Recent Fabrication-Motives to Falsify
The admissibility of prior consistent statements to corroborate
a witness whose testimony has been impeached by charges of fabrication, interest, bias or corruption, first arose m the State of Washington in the case of State v. Mannville (1894)29 In that case
Mannville was convicted of murder and appealed. During the
progress of the trial, appellant called one Hartsock, who testified
that Conboy, a witness for the state, had made a statement to him
the day the tragedy occurred, concerning the manner m which the
shooting was done, which statement was at variance with a material point in Conboy's testimony The state, in rebuttal, introduced
three witnesses who testified that the statement made by Conboy to
Hartsock was substantially the same as the statement made by him
on the witness stand. Appellant alleged error in the admission of
the testimony of the three witnesses to corroborate Conboy, contending that the testimony of a witness cannot be sustained by
showing that his testimony corresponds with statements that he has
previously made. In discussing the alleged error, the court said
"While the general doctrine announced in that case
(Ellicot v. Pearl (supra), which appellant had cited as sustaining his contention), and which is, no doubt, a correct
doctrine, sustains appellant's contention, the exception
made to the general rule is as plainly enunciated as the
rule itself, and the case at bar falls squarely within the
scope of the exception instead of the rule."
There is a difference, however, between the Mannville case and
the ordinary case in which the recent fabrication rule is invoked,
because the three witnesses testified in effect that Hartsock was
mistaken as to what Conboy's statement was, and the evidence
was not admissible in corroboration of Conboy but in contradiction of Hartsock, i.e., to show that Hartsock had misunderstood
Conboy, and that therefore, no inconsistent statement had been
made.
2For
a detailed discussion of the two holdings see 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), Secs. 1133-1140, pp. 654-662. Many of the caess holding
the details of the complaint admissible are also justifiable upon the
grounds that in the particular instance the complaint was so recent as to
be considered within the rule admitting res gestae statements.
"8 Wash. 523, 36 Pac. 470 (1894).
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The court, however, first held it came within the recent fabrication exception, saying"The defendant in this case assailed the testimony of
Conboy as a fabrication. That was the object of Hartsock's
testimony, to make it appear to the jury that at first Conboy had told the truth, but that subsequently he had fabricated the statement winch he made under oath."
The majority of courts, however, hold prior consistent statements inadmissible where the only impeaching evidence is a prior
contradictory statement, because the imputation that he made a
prior contradictory statement is not removed by showing he made a
prior consistent statement.3 0 Nor is the showing of a prior consistent
statement, assailing evidence as a recent fabrication, as was intimated by the court. The evidence, 'owever, was as before stated,
admissible for the purposes of showing it was never made. The
court recognized its admisibility for this purpose, for further in
its opinion it said.
"It seems to us that this testimony was plainly admissible to show, or at least to tend to show, that Conboy did
not make the statement attributed to him by Hartsock, but
that Hartsock was mistaken. It was the same conversation
that they were testifying to that Hartsoek had testified to,
not an attempt to prove that at some other time and place
the witness had made another or different statement."
It seems clear, upon an analysis of the facts of the case that the
admissibility of the prior statement did not depend upon the recent
fabrication exception, and if it had been admitted on that ground
alone, would have been out of line with the great weight of author-

ity
The next time the question arose in Washington was in the case
of State v. Coates (1900) "- In tins case the defense impeached
the state's main witness by proof of a contradictory statement made
to three police officers. The witness, at the time, was under arrest
and the evidence showed that his statement was made after he had
been sweated for an hour, and after certain promises of lenience
had been made to him. Upon the showing of the contradictory statement, the prosecution offered to show a consistent statement to cor?, Citcago City 1R. Co. v. Mathzeson, 212 Ill. 292, 72 N. E. 443 (1904)
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray (Mass.) 485 (1858).
1 2 2 Wash. 601, 61 Pac. 726 (1900).
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roborate the witness. In holding the evidence admissible, the court
first cited from the case of Dassett v. Miller (1855),82 as follows
"Where the credit of a witness is attacked upon the
ground that he had made statements inconsistent with the
statements that he had made in court, testimony may be
heard to show that at other times and on other occasions the
witness had made statements consistent with his testimony
given in court."
The court then commented on the fact that this rule had been
denied in the leading case of Commonwealth v. Jenkmvs (1858),83
and then made the following citation from that case
"The decision of the point raised in this case is not to be
understood as conflicting with a class of cases in which a
witness is sought to be impeached, by cross-examination or
by independent evidence, tending to show that at the time
of giving his evidence he is under a strong bias or in such a
situation as to put him under a sort of moral duress to
testify in a particular way In such case, it is competent to
rebut this ground of impeachment and to support the credit
of the witness by showing that when he was under no such
bias, or when he was free from any influence or pressure, he
made statements similar to those which he has given at the
trial. "
The court then stated that "the rule laid down by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts case is perhaps the correct rule," and
under it the testimony was admissible. The Massachusetts case is
undoubtedly the weight of authority on the question, and it is
submitted that the Washington case is only supportable on the
theory that the inconsistent statement was made at a time when
there was no influence or pressure upon him, and, therefore, worthy
of some corroborative force.
The next case in which the point was raised in this jurisdiction,
was Callihan v. Wash. Water Power Co. (1902) 8 That was an
action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, who claimed
to have been a passenger on defendant's cars. The defendant demed
that she was a passenger, and the conductor testified that she was
not. To corroborate the conductor's testimony, the defendant company was permitted to introduce the conductor's trip report showing the number of passengers carried on the trip in question. Ap3 Sneed 71 (1855).
10 Gray 485 (1858).
"27 Wash. 154, 67 Pac. 697 (1902).
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pellant claimed the evidence was self-serving and therefore Madmissible. The court held that the case came under the exception to
the general rule, and that the evidence was admissible for the reason
that the conductor, being an employee of the defendant company,
would be prompted to testify in favor of his employer, and that
there existed a motive for him to fabricate. The court sets out the
exception under winch this evidence was admitted, in the following language.
"If a witness be impeached by proof of his having previously made statements that were in contradiction of evidence tending to show that the witness' account of the
transaction was a fabrication of recent date, it may be
shown that he gave a similar account, before its effect and
operation could be foreseen."
Inasmuch as the witness' testimony was not attacked as a recent
fabrication in this case, it would seem that the court, in arriving
at its decision, really made a loose statement of the rule that a
witness charged with a motive or interest to msstate or misrepresent the facts concerning which he has testified, consequent upon or
growing out of the relation to the cause or the litigant in whose
behalf he gave testimony, may be supported and corroborated by
proof that he made statements consistent and in harmony with his
testimony before its effect and operation could be foreseen.
In three of the remaining four cases which have been determined
on this particular point in this state, the rule was invoked under
somewhat similar circumstances. In the case of Conover v. HeherRoss Co. (1905),31 the plaintiff, Conover, had had his arm cut off mn
the defendant's shingle mill, and sued for damages. The defendant
introduced evidence that the plaintiff had made a statement soon
after the accident that his injury occurred through his own fault,
and the trial judge admitted evidenge of statements consistent with
plaintiff's testimony on the stand. The court held such evidence
admissible.
In the case of State v. Spisak (1917),86 the accused, mna trial of
assault, was impeached by the testimony of the sheriff, that at the
time of his arrest, he had made inconsistent statements. The court
held that accused was entitled to corroborate his testimony by showing that he had made other statements consistent with his testimony
on the stand, on the day of hIs conversation with the sheriff.
338

Wash. 172, 80 Pac. 281 (1905).
"94 Wash. 566, 162 Pac. 998 (1917).
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In the case of RusselZ v. Cavelero (1926), 8 the plaintiff was m
the employ of defendant as a farmhand and was injured by falling
through the haychute while working in the hay mow of the defendant's barn. Three witnesses testified that defendant had said that
his injuries were the result of his own fault. The plaintiff, in rebuttal, offered to show prior consistent statements. The court held
such evidence admissible. After citing the general rule excluding
prior consistent statements, the court continued
"But many of the courts recognize and we have recognized an exception to the rule. When a witness has been
impeached by showing that he has made statements concerning the event to which he testifies at the trial contradictory of his evidence there given, and the impeaching evidence is of such a nature as to indicate that his testimony is
a fabrication of recent date, proof of antecedent statements
of the witness consistent with his testimony may be introduced."
Relating to the admissibility of the statements in the Callihan
case, supra, it was said
"The undoubted theory which appellant sought to impress upon the jury was that respondent's testimony at the
trial was a recent fabrication."
And in the Spisak case, supra, that
"This state is committed to the rule that evidence of
prior consistent statement is admissible when testimony is
assailed as a recent fabrication, and that it is so assailed
when it is susceptible of such attack before the jury "
It should be noticed that in these three cases the impeachment
was a prior inconsistent statement. As before noted, the mere fact
that a prior inconsistent statement has been made will not warrant,
by the weight of authority, the introduction of a prior consistent
statement, because it in nowise tends to show the prior inconsistent
statement was not made. The Supreme Court of Washington
acknowledged this in the case of State v. Coates, supra, but in all
its subsequent decisions it has held that the introduction of a prior
inconsistent statement is of such a nature as to indicate that the
witness' testimony is a fabrication of recent date. The Washington
Court seems to be the only court which has held that the mere introducing of such evidence is attacking the testimony of a witness
as a recent fabrication. The test laid down by the court, that testi3"139 Wash. 177, 246 Pac. 25 (1926).
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mony is assailed as a recent fabrication when it is susceptible of
such attack before the jury, seems to be also peculiar to the Washington Court alone. It is unquestionably a broader test than has been
adopted by any other court in its application of the recent fabrication rule as such. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would seem
that practically any impeachment would justify the admission of
prior consistent statements in corroboration.
The Conover, Spisak and Russell cases seem to be also without
authority on another ground. The cases in other jurisdiction seem
to hold that even where there has been a charge of recent fabrication, evidence of consistent statements is admisible only in those
cases where the consistent statements were made when the effect of
making them could not have been foreseen. In other words, if the
motives and interests of the witness at the time of making the
consistent statements were the same as the time of giving his evidence
at the trial, evidence of such statements is not admissible. In these
three cases, the prior consistent statements were all made subsequent to the time the party had been injured or accused of crime.
It would seem clear that any statement made at such a time could
hardly have been said to have been made at a time when the witness
would not have a motive to speak in his own interests. The fact
that he has made similar statements at a time when his interest is
the same as at the trial, could have no probative weight as corroborative evidence, and consequently, should be rejected. Although
the determination of whether or not a motive to fabricate existed at
the time the statement was made, is within the discretion of the
trial judge, still it is hard to reconcile the fact that no motive to
fabricate did not exist, when the parties were in the position of
prospective litigants.
The only other case on this particular question in Washington is
that of State v. Braniff (1919).38 Braniff was convicted of larceny
of certain horses. Practically the only testimony against accused
was that of two accomplices. The defense, in its opening statement,
made the statement that the charge was a "frame up." During crossexamination of one of the accomplices by defense counsel, he was
asked and answered as follows.
Q. Is it not a fact, Roy, that you and Sank and Bosley
ran off the horses, and afterwards made up the scheme to
throw the blame onto Tom Braniff ?
A. No, it is not.
-105 Wash. 327, 177 Pac. 801 (1919).
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The State was then allowed to corroborate the witnesses by testimony of the sheriff that in his confession one of the accomplices had
made previous consistent statements. The Supreme Court, on appeal, held this was reversible error on the grounds that such impeachment did not amount to an assailing of the witness' testimony
as a recent fabrication. The court seems to intimate that positive
impeaching evidence, such as a prior inconsistent statement, is
necessary before the rule may be invoked. It would seem that such
a holding is indicative of an intention to interpret strictly the test
as to when testimony has been so impeached as to render it susceptible of an attack as a recent fabrication. The court is still
committed to the view, however, that showing prior inconsistent
statements is assailing testimony as a recent fabrication.3 9
The court also said.
"This is not a case of Clarke making a previous consistent statement against his own interest, nor is it a case of
Clarke making a previous consistent statement at a time
when he had any motive or interest different from that at
the time he testified in this case, insofar as we are concerned
with appellant's rights here involved."
The court was unquestionably correct as to this point, which
would also seem to indicate a tendency to return to the rule in its
stricter form in this respect. In the Russell case, supra, however,
the fact that the witness making the statement was a party litigant,
who certainly did not make the prior statement at a time when he
had any motive or interest different from that at the time he testified, was not even mentioned.
B. Complaint in Sex Crimes.
The rule allowing the corroboration of an assaulted female in
cases of rape and assault with intent to ravish, by showing the fact
of complaint was early recognized in Washington in the case of
State v. Bunter (1898) 40 In that case the court held it was not
error to permit the mother of the prosecutrix to testify that the
prosecutrix made complaint to her. The court noted the seeming
conflict upon the question as to the admissibility of the details of
the complaint and concluded by saying"After a pretty thorough examination of the cases we
think the better rule is to restrict the evidence to the fact
" Russell v. Cavelero, 139 Wash. 177, 246 Pac. 25 (1926).
'018 Wash. 670, 52 Pac. 247 (1898).

PREVIOUS CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
of complaint, and that anything beyond that is hearsay of
the grossest character."
Since this case was decided, the question has been before the
court several times and it has consistently adhered to this doctrine,
holding it to be reversible error wherever the trial court has allowed
the details of the complaint to be admitted in evidence. 41
The Washington Court has also taken the position in this type
of cases that the complaint should only be admissible when seasonably made. This was first held in the case of State -w. Griffin
(1908) .42 In that case the appellant was charged with the crime of
rape upon a girl fifteen years of age who had lived with appellant
and Ins wife at their hotel about two and one-half years prior to the
commssion of the alleged offense. She made no complaint until
nearly a year and a half after testimony showed the appellant first
took liberties with her person, until about eight months after he had
made his first felomous assault, and until nearly six months after
the crime was consummated. No threat, no restraint, or lack of opportunityto excuse the delay was shown. The court, in holding that
under such circumstances the fact of complaint should be excluded,
said.
"Since the only purpose of admitting evidence of the
complaint is to show that the conduct of the prosecuting
witness was consistent with her testimony, and to rebut any
inference that might arise from silence or concealment, it
would seem to follow, on principle, that evidence of the
complaint should be excluded whenever from delay or
otherwise it ceases to have corroborative force. In the
nature of things there must be some limit of time beyond
While under
wich such complaints cease to corroborate
ordinary circumstances the court must submit the complaint with all the attending circumstances to the jury,
under proper instructions, yet in a case such as this, where
there have been months of inexcusable delay, we think that
State v. Griffin,43 Wash. 591, 86 Pac. 951 (1906). In this case it was
held reversible error to permit the witnesses to whom the prosecutrix had
made complaint to state the name of the person whom she claimed to have
committed the offense. In the cases of State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 136
Pac. 137 (sodomy case) (1913) State v. Aldrtck, 97 Wash. 593, 166 Pac.
1130 (1917) and State v. Arnold, 144 Wash. 367, 258 Pac. 20 (1927), the
complete details of the complaint had been admitted. Tls was held erroneous in each case, the court, in Aldrzck case, saying: "This court has
adopted the view that, while the complaint may be shown, the details or
particulars are subject to objection." In the following cases the general rule
that the fact of complaint is admissible was enunciated: State V. Myrberg,
56'Wash. 384, 105 Pac. 622 (1909),.State v. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 144 Pac. 711
(1914) State v. Dixon, 143 Wash. 262, 255' Pac. 109 (1927).
S'43 Wash.591, 86 Pac. 951 (1906).
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justice demands that the complaint should be entirely excluded from the consideration of the jury "
To bring the case within this rule it is only necessary, however,
that the complaint be seasonably made, which is a relative question,
resting for the most part in the discretion of the trial court. It
was held in the case of State v. Myrberg (1909),4 3 that where the
time of the alleged rape was fixed by the state as the last of February or first of March, complaints made by the prosecutrix about
the first or middle of March were seasonably made.
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3 56 Wash. 384, 105 Pac. 622 (1909).
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